International Coordination of Fiscal Policy in Limiting Economies
研究当国家市场势力趋近于零时，合作与非合作财政政策的极限行为，发现若存在国内扭曲（如扭曲税），即使单一国家无法影响世界价格，协调仍可能带来收益。
The authors examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries' market power goes to zero. They show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump-sum taxation. However, if there are unremovable domestic distortions, such as distorting taxes, there can be gains to coordination even when a single country's policy cannot affect world prices. These results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature. The key distinction is that, contrary to the tariff literature, the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.