Public Choice and the Extent of the Market
分析政治集体行动如何通过禁止、监管和税收支出三类制度约束来限制市场交易，并联系亚当·斯密关于市场范围决定生产率的定理。
SUMMARY In analyzing political processes, public choice scholars invoke a two‐level choice, choices within rules and constitutional choices among sets of rules. This paper considers rules that set the limits for market choice through the political‐collective action. Three familiar categories of institutional constraints are examined: prohibition, regulation, and taxation‐public spending, that are significant in limiting the trading process. The motivation for institutional‐constitutional construction may originate from sources other than economic objectives. We note that institutional parameters include political and legal constraints, as supplemented by traditions and conventions which may affect choice behavior. We relate the analysis to Adam Smith's vision of the achievement of natural liberty and economic progress through his theorem that economic productivity depends on market size.