The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence
识别了非合作进入威慑模型中是否存在搭便车问题的一个关键性质，解释了不同研究得出相反结论的原因，并表明对已有模型进行合理修改会导致在位企业在进入威慑上投资不足。
A number of authors have recently considered whether the free rider problem is exhibited in models characterized by multiple potential entrants/sequential entry. Bernheim (1984) and Eaton and Ware (1987) find that the free rider problem is not an important factor, while McLean and Riordan (1989) find that it is. In this article I identify a general property whose presence is important for whether a model of noncooperative entry deterrence exhibits a free rider problem, and in this way help clarify why the above-mentioned authors reach these diverse conclusions. The article also demonstrates that quite plausible changes in the specifications of both Bernheim and Eaton and Ware lead to incumbent firms underinvesting in entry deterrence.