Elections and Discretionary Accruals: Evidence from 2004
研究了2004年美国大选期间，与国会候选人有关联的外包企业如何通过减少利润的应计项目来管理盈余，以应对外包议题带来的审查压力。
ABSTRACT We examine the accrual choices of outsourcing firms with links to U.S. congressional candidates during the 2004 elections, when corporate outsourcing was a major campaign issue. We find that politically connected firms with more extensive outsourcing activities have more income‐decreasing discretionary accruals. Further, relative to adjacent periods, the evidence is concentrated in the two calendar quarters immediately preceding the 2004 election, consistent with heightened incentives for firms to manage earnings during the election season. The incentives can be attributed to donor firms' concerns about the potentially negative consequences of scrutiny over outsourcing for themselves and for their affiliated candidates.