Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
分析了企业在工人完成教育前可发出录用要约的斯彭斯信号模型，发现无生产效率时教育浪费消失，有生产效率时低能力工人过度教育以混同高能力者，而高能力者反而教育不足。
We analyse a version of Spence's job market signalling model in which firms can make job offers before workers complete their education. Workers cannot commit to turning down such offers. Offers are private, so that workers are unable to use one firm's offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms. In the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education, there is no wasteful education. When education is productive, the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers. In our model, less able workers become overeducated to (partially) pool with more able workers. The pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers, who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated. We examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model.