Social Welfare of Alternative Controlled-Price Policies
使用CES社会福利函数和功利主义与词典式最小规则的加权平均，在政府定价且主体风险厌恶的经济中识别最优生产者价格，并区分商业生产者、农民、消费者和纳税人的利益。对津巴布韦的应用表明，若平等偏好适中，玉米生产者价格在历史范围的中低至中等部分是社会最优的。
Recent developments in social welfare analysis provide insights into the selection of price policies. In the presen t paper a CES social welfare function and a weighted average of utilitarian and leximin rules are used to identify optimal producer prices in an economy where government is the price setter and agents are risk averse. The analysis distinguishes between the interests of commercial producers, peasant producers, consumers, and taxpayers. A n application to Zimbabwe indicates that a maize producer price in the low-medium to medium portion of the historical range would be social ly optimal if egalitarian preferences are moderate. This outcome is somewhat insensitive to group weighting schemes and to interpersonal utility correspondences. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.