The Relation between IPO Underpricing and Litigation Risk Revisited: Changes between 1990 and 2002
重新检验了不同法律和经济环境下IPO抑价的诉讼风险假说，发现1995年《私人证券诉讼改革法案》通过后，诉讼风险对抑价策略的影响减弱，但随后又出现结构性变化，抑价再次被用作诉讼保险。
This paper reexamines the litigation risk hypothesis of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in different legal and economic environments. When litigation risk is reduced in the three‐year period after the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, firms' litigation risk plays a less significant role in IPO underpricing strategy. Furthermore, underpricing deters more traditional IPO lawsuits compared to that effect in the pre‐1995 period. In the period after that, however, there is another structural change in which firms again use underpricing as insurance against IPO lawsuits. This underpricing may actually have led to greater litigation relating to IPO allocation irregularities.