Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
指出时间不一致问题源于政府有动机制造意外通胀或偏离前任政府宣布的税收路径，并证明通过管理不同期限的名义和指数化政府债券可以消除这两个问题。
The problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources. First, as shown by Guillermo A. Calvo (1978), the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation. Second, as discussed by Robert E. Lucas and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government. In th is paper, it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management, involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.