The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labour Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On‐the‐job Search
研究了在职搜寻如何使雇主规避法定解雇成本，发现更高的解雇成本会加剧在职跳槽、减少失业者就业，且忽视在职搜寻会高估解雇成本对就业的负面影响。
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model that allows for employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job Search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.