WAGE SIGNALING: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTRAFIRM BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRIC LEARNING*
分析雇主与工人谈判如何影响工资动态，当现任与潜在雇主信息不对称时，工人通过工资信号传递能力，模型解释了具有相似可观测特征的工人群体中工资离散度增加的现象。
The article analyzes the effect of employer–worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers. A failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss. Because the disagreement points depend upon the worker's productivity, productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages. In existing models of asymmetric learning, wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics. This model, in contrast, generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics.