Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
构建模型分析候选人通过向利益集团承诺服务（如立法支持、官僚干预）换取竞选捐款，并刻画选举均衡，解释为何现任议员连任成功率超90%。
Candidates for office are modeled as promising services, such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy, to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions. An electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service-contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute. The model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents' success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests: a recognition advantage, a high personal valuation of the office, a lower cost of providing services, and policy alignment with high demand interest groups. The model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes.