The Internal Distribution of Union Rents: An Empirical Test of the Voting Power Model
检验了美国工会的工资平等政策是否源于低技能多数群体的自利投票，发现当高技能工人占多数时，工会的租金分配并未显著改变，不支持技能群体联盟驱动分配政策的假设。
The egalitarian wage policies of labor unions in the United States have been attributed to low-skilled majorities pursuing their self-interest in a majority rule environment. For this hypothesis to be more than a formalization of stylized facts requires evidence that unions are not egalitarian when the work place is not characterized.by a low-skilled majority. The author considers the impact of high-skilled majorities on (1) voting behavior in certification elections and (2) rent distribution policies in existing unions. Neither analysis supports the belief that union rent distribution policies are driven by skill-group coalitions pursuing their self-interests. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.