Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
研究两个使用可计算算法的智能体在博弈中能否理性行动，发现若限制在特定可解博弈和理性对手范围内，理性行动可行且结果达到纳什均衡；但不同博弈域需要不同算法，不存在普适的理性算法。
Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. We show that it is possible to act rationally provided we limit our attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium. Going further we show that rationality is possible on many domains of games and opposing algorithms but each domain requires a particular solution algorithm; no one algorithm is rational on all possible domains.