Incumbent strategic behavior in financial markets and the exit of entrepreneurial start‐ups
实证研究发现在位企业通过金融市场战略行为（如加剧逆向选择和道德风险）提高创业型初创企业的退出概率，尤其在高竞争行业和杠杆率高的企业中效果显著。
Abstract This paper empirically investigates the forces that shape the post‐entry exit probability of entrepreneurial start‐ups, with an emphasis on the impact of incumbents' strategic behavior in financial markets. We find that entrepreneurial start‐ups in highly competitive industries are more likely to exit and that leverage compounds this exit risk. However, the latter result only holds when potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets are large at start‐up. Under these circumstances, competitors can negatively influence creditors' perceptions on entrepreneurial quality or behavior through aggressive strategic actions to impede future financing and induce the start‐up's exit. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.