Disclosure policy choices of UK firms receiving modified audit reports
研究81家在1982-1990年间首次收到非标准审计意见的英国公司，发现管理者倾向于披露不利信息，但许多财务困难公司对未来业绩的乐观披露被市场打折，证实了自愿披露中的激励问题。
This study examines discretionary disclosures and stock price effects for 81 UK firms that received first-time modified audit reports during 1982–1990. Results indicate that these firms' managers are forthcoming about adverse developments, and appear to perceive the advantages of withholding negative news to be minimal. However, managers of many of the 58 stressed sample firms make disclosures about expected future performance that are overly optimistic relative to financial outcomes. As expected, stock market participants discount these stressed firms' positive tone disclosures. Evidence in this study confirms that there is a strong incentive problem with voluntary disclosure.