The Cabals of a Few or the Confusion of a Multitude: The Institutional Trade-off Between Representation and Governance
研究政治制度在代表性与治理目标之间的权衡，利用美国社区发展整笔拨款项目30年数据发现，代表性更强的政府（市议会规模更大）倾向于将更多拨款用于补充财政收入而非减税，偏离治理理想。
Our model illustrates how political institutions trade off between the competing goals of representation and governance, where governance is the responsiveness of an institution to a single pivotal voter. We use exogenous variation from the 30-year history of the federal Community Development Block Grant program to identify this trade-off. Cities with more representative governments—those with larger city councils—use more grant funds to supplement city revenues rather than implementing tax cuts, thereby moving policy further away from the governance ideal. In sum, more representative government is not without cost.