A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
研究n人联盟谈判的序贯出价模型，分析时间贴现下严格超可加博弈的平稳均衡效率，发现延迟和低效子联盟可能形成，但高效均衡支付随贴现因子趋近1收敛到核心，严格凸性保证高效均衡存在。
We explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Our focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games, when the discount factor δ is sufficiently large; we do, however, consider examples of other games where subgame perfectness alone is employed. It is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core, as δ → 1. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high δ. This vector converges as δ → 1 to the egalitarian allocation of Dutta and Ray (1989).