Policy choices and interdependence of country decisions in the implementation of the 1994 GATT Agreement on agriculture
揭示了GATT农业协定中不同义务之间的关联，指出各国政策选择相互依赖，形成博弈结构，忽视这一点的模型预测可能出错。
This paper discusses the linkages among the different obligations entailed in the GATT Agreement on Agriculture. It is shown that each country's choice between feasible policy alternatives crucially depends on the analogous choices made by other countries. This means that there is a game structure inherent in the GATT implementation process. Any modelling effort aimed at forecasting the implications of implementing the GATT Agreement which does not take into consideration the linkages among the various commitments, the policy choices to be made by each country, or the game structure inherent in the implementation process, is likely to yield incorrect results.