On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
证明，如果经济体的参与者无法被分成没有潜在利益冲突的群体（即经济不可分解），那么任何连续的诚实占优配置机制都会在偏好配置的一个开稠密集上产生非最优结果。经典埃奇沃思盒交换经济、公共品经济及存在外部性的经济均被证明是不可分解的。
It is shown that if an economy's participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests--i.e., if the economy is indecomposable--then every continuous truth-dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles. Classical Edgeworth-box exchange economies (economies with no externalities and no production, but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods), as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities, are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable. The results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.