Self-Fulfilling Expectations, Speculative Attack, and Capital Controls
研究固定汇率制度下资本管制的内生实施，证明即使当前和预期的货币政策与永久可行的无管制固定汇率制度一致，若政策制定者对官方外汇储备大幅下降的反应有非零概率引入管制，仍可能发生投机攻击，因此资本管制可能是自我实现预期的结果而非不当经济政策的产物。
This paper examines the endogenous implementation of capital controls in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime. It is shown that if there exists a nonzero probability that the policymaker's response to a significant decrease in official foreign reserves will be the introduction of controls, a speculative attack may occur even when current and expected monetary policy is consistent with a permanently viable, control-free, fixed exchange rate regime. Consequently, capital controls may be the outcome of self-fulfilling expectations rather than the result of imprudent economic policies. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.