Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis
研究信息不对称导致的低风险借款人信贷配给问题，分析不同类型政府贷款项目对经济效率的影响，发现成本有效的项目可能反而加剧低效。
Asymmetric information about borrower default probabilities may lead to inefficient credit rationing of low‐risk borrowers in otherwise competitive markets. In a simple model having these properties, we show that some types of government loan programs, such as loan guarantees issued through lenders, might improve economic efficiency. But the incentive for high‐risk borrowers to misrepresent their loan quality is worsened by other government loan programs, notably those that try to target aid directly to rationed borrowers. As such, cost‐effective programs may increase inefficiency. This surprising result highlights the need to conduct model‐specific policy analyses, as opposed to analyses based on model‐free performance indicators.