When Do Banks Listen to Their Analysts? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
研究了金融机构内部部门间的利益冲突和信息流动，发现并购公告后银行持股变化与其分析师推荐变化正相关，且该关系在分析师利益冲突最小时最强。
We examine the conflicts of interest and the flow of information between divisions of financial institutions. Using data on analyst recommendations and stockholdings of in-vestment banks advising acquirers in mergers, we find evidence that information from investment banking flows to other divisions of the bank. Specifically, following a merger announcement, changes in a bank’s stockholdings of the acquirer are positively associated with changes in recommendations by its analyst. This relationship, however, does not ex-ist before the merger announcement. Additional tests show that the relationship between stockholdings and recommendations following a merger announcement is strongest when conflicts of interest for analysts are likely the smallest. Financial institutions engage in a broad range of activities. Investment banks, for example, commonly act as underwriters, lenders, asset managers, and providers of investment recommendations. By offering multiple services, in-formation generated from one division can be transferred to another in ways not possible when divisions stand alone. Along these lines, Sufi (2004) and Duarte-Silva (2010) show how information gained from a bank’s lending activ-