ON THE INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF BANK REGULATION
将银行监管分为经济、审慎和信息三类，分别讨论国际协调的必要性与风险，指出经济监管协调可降低保护主义，审慎协调作用有限，信息监管无需协调。
This paper offers a three-way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category. For economic regulation, the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes, but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers; the latter efforts should be encouraged. For prudential regulation, national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking. Harmonization efforts (e.g. the Basle accord) may offer only modest help; but the Accord may offer indirect help, by limiting national governments' competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks' risk-taking activities. Finally, for information regulation, national regulation appears to be adequate, and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.