Determinants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs
分析了1980-1988年间美国储蓄机构处置成本的决定因素，发现1980年代末的模型与早期显著不同，且有形净值系统性地低估了市场净值，对研究金融危机和监管政策有参考价值。
ABSTRACT This paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980–1988. A simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution. This model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies. The empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s. This evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator's closure rule. Our econometric evidence, moreover, is consistent with the hypothesis that, for troubled institutions, tangible net worth systematically understates market‐value net worth. In addition, the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed.