MANAGERIAL AND OWNERSHIP SUCCESSION AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: THE CASE OF MANAGEMENT BUY‐INS*
研究了同时更换管理层和所有权对公司重组的影响，基于管理层买入的案例证据，发现激励虽充分但存在信息不对称、企业家与情境匹配困难及风险资本监控等问题。
ABSTRACT This paper addresses the effects on corporate restructuring of changing management and ownership. First, it synthesises a number of perspectives on corporate restructuring which involve managerial succession, voluntary restructuring, agency theory, incentives and entrepreneurship, to obtain insights into the relative impact of simultaneously changing either, neither or both management and ownership. Second, it uses case study evidence from management buy‐ins to examine the effects of changing both management and ownership. the evidence suggests that whilst management may be adequately incentivized, problems may arise in respect of information asymmetries, difficulties in matching entrepreneurs to the context and monitoring by venture capitalists, and implementation of strategies.