Privatisation and X-Inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach
用讨价还价模型分析私有化如何影响工人努力程度，发现私有化可能提高努力、降低X-低效率，但工资变化不确定。
The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. The authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity. Public sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and therefore, compared to private sector firms, they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart. The authors' model predicts that, under certain conditions, privatization should raise effort and so lower X-inefficiency, and that wages may increase or decrease. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.