Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior
研究了最优证明标准的严格程度，发现放松证明标准虽能增强威慑，但也会抑制理想行为，结果与仅关注威慑的简单模型显著不同。
The optimal stringency of the burden of proof is characterized in a model in which relaxing the proof burden enhances deterrence but also chills desirable behavior. The result are strikingly different from those in prior work that uses a simpler model in which individuals only choose whether to commit a harmful act (so only deterrence is at stake). Moreover, the qualitative differences between the optimal rule and the familiar preponderance of the evidence rule—and related rules that look to Bayesian posteriors—are great, much more so than revealed by prior work.