Auditor Conservatism and Investment Efficiency
构建理论模型，分析审计师保守主义的影响因素及其对投资效率的作用，并探讨萨班斯-奥克斯利法案第201条对审计质量和投资效率的潜在负面影响。
ABSTRACT: We develop a theoretical framework to investigate (1) both the determinants and the consequences of auditor conservatism in a capital market setting and (2) the implications of Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for auditor conservatism and investment efficiency. We derive three primary results. First, by adjusting the mix of audit and nonaudit fees, companies with high business risk induce auditor conservatism, while companies with low business risk induce auditor aggressiveness. Second, if auditor conservatism is in force, a greater client pressure on auditors improves audit quality; but if auditor aggressiveness is in force, a greater client pressure on auditors impairs audit quality. Third, the nature of a firm's investment inefficiency (overinvestment or underinvestment) depends on its auditor's attestation (conservative or aggressive). Our analysis also implies that a mandatory restriction of nonaudit services imposed by Section 201 may decrease audit quality and damage investment efficiency.