Collective Labor Supply and Welfare
构建了一个家庭劳动供给的集体模型，假设家庭成员有各自偏好且决策帕累托有效，通过两阶段决策过程推导出可检验的约束，并证明劳动供给行为足以恢复个人偏好和收入分享规则。
This paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption. This setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies. Moreover, the observation of labor-supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule (up to a constant). Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.