Multilateral agricultural trade negotiations: a non-cooperative and cooperative game approach
用非合作与合作博弈框架建模农业贸易谈判，分析欧盟、美国及世界其他地区的博弈均衡，发现汇率影响结果，且通过国内补偿美国能说服欧盟适度改革，国际补偿则使欧盟降低保护但未完全自由贸易。
Agricultural trade negotiations are modelled using a non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of the games. Through the use of intra-country compensation, the analysis shows that the US is able to convince the EU to adopt modest reform. With inter-country compensation the EU chooses a decreased level of protection, but does not choose completely free trade.