Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
研究当员工有职业担忧（即当前表现影响未来薪酬）时，最优薪酬合同如何平衡隐性激励（来自职业担忧）与显性激励（来自合同），并发现接近退休的高管显性激励最强，CEO薪酬与股市表现的关系支持这一预测。
This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. The authors show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. The authors find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.