Corporate Reorganizations and Non‐Cash Auctions
扩展了非现金拍卖理论，分析不同证券在拍卖中的收益和效率，发现证券可能提高收入但导致竞标者混同，建议采用新的现金拍卖来设计激励合同。
This paper extends the theory of non‐cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggests using non‐cash auctions to increase cash‐constrained bidder participation. We examine this proposal and demonstrate that securities may lead to higher revenue. However, bidders pool unless bids include debt, which results in possible repossession by the seller. This suggests all‐equity outcomes are unlikely and explains the high debt of reorganized firms. Securities also inefficiently determine bidders' incentive contracts and the firm's capital structure. Therefore, we recommend a new cash auction for an incentive contract.