Nash Implementation of Matching Rules
研究匹配问题中帕累托最优且个体理性规则的纳什实施，证明所有此类规则都是稳定规则的上解，并指出稳定规则是满足帕累托最优和个体理性的最小可实施解。
We consider the Nash implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these solutions, we show that the “lower bound” stable rule and the “upper bound” Pareto and individually rational rule are Nash implementable. The proofs of these results are by means of a recent technique developed by Danilov [2]. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational and the stable rule is the minimal Nash implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D78.