The Importance of Compensating Strategic Network Board Members for Network Performance: A Contingency Approach
基于53个政府支持的中小企业战略网络五年面板数据，研究补偿董事会成员对网络绩效的影响，发现补偿效果取决于代理或管家关系的权变因素。
Firms in government‐supported strategic networks tend to rely on professional network board members for support and assistance. As such, two significant issues arise: should board members be compensated and under which circumstances is compensation more – or less – effective for network performance. Based on yearly panel data from 53 government‐supported strategic networks of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises over a five‐year period, this study examines the effects of compensating network board members. Advocating for a contingency approach, we combine the agency and stewardship literatures to posit that the effects of compensation are moderated by contingency factors that stimulate either an agency or stewardship relationship between the network board and the networking firms. Our findings indicate that significant funding, network firms represented on the network board, and top‐down network formation stimulate board members to become agents rather than stewards. This therefore explains the higher effect of board member compensation under such conditions.