Why Do Bidders Do Badly Out of Mergers? Some UK Evidence
基于Roll的傲慢假说，从理论和实证上拒绝赢家诅咒假说，转而支持讨价还价理论，即并购条款由双方合并意愿决定，并受市场溢价影响。
This paper builds on Roll’s hubris hypothesis as to why bidders overpay. It rejects the winner’s curse hypothesis (which implies that the generosity of the merger terms increases the probability of a successful bid) on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The empirical study examines a bargaining theory approach: that the terms offered are determined by the parties’ individual eagerness to merge. It also examines a modification of this: that the terms are dominated by the existence of a premium required by the market irrespective of synergy, thereby also dominating the decision as to whether a bid should be made.