Signaling, Information Content, and the Reluctance to Cut Dividends
检验了管理者不愿削减股息这一说法的现有实证证据，指出其局限性，并设计新测试来反驳与这种不愿削减相关的信息内容假说。
Managerial aversion to reduce dividends is not only an assertion to be found in the financial literature (see, for example, [2], [4], [8], [9]), but is also the basis for the informational content of dividends hypothesis (see [8]). Furthermore, its existence, if known to investors, can explain dividend payments which involve tax and transaction related costs. Surprisingly, the empirical evidence on this assertion is less than satisfactory. This study examines the existing empirical evidence on this assertion and points out its limitations. A new test, that can refute the informational content associated with the reluctance to cut dividends, is then performed.