Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
分析买卖双方在专用资本投资后违约谈判的情形，比较三种损害赔偿措施（特定履行、预期损害赔偿、信赖损害赔偿）对投资效率的影响，发现它们按帕累托效率从高到低排序。
This article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it. It is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion, and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way. Without enforceable contracts, the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment. Three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be Pareto-ranked from best to worst as follows: specific performance, expectation damages, and reliance damages.