Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts
基于信息不对称和晋升激励，研究了企业选择标准晋升实践还是晋升或离职合同的条件，发现企业专用人力资本低时采用后者，高时采用前者；若工资下限可行且努力重要，则两类工作相似时也采用后者。
This article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up-or-out contracts. Our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives. We find that firms employ up-or-out contracts when firm-specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high. We also find that, if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important, up-or-out is employed when low- and high-level jobs are similar. These results are consistent with many of the settings in which up-or-out is typically observed, such as law firms and academia.