Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers
研究检验了并购创造价值的假设，发现财务协同效应和目标公司管理层行为空间会提高溢价，而实际协同效应无显著影响；竞标者的存在也显著影响溢价。
Hypotheses about the creation of value by mergers are tested on premia paid in a sample of one hundred recent acquisitions. The premia increase with financial, although not with real, synergies and with the scope for "managerial" behavior in the target firms. The acquirers' willingness to pay also increases with their scope for managerial behavior. The presence of either actual and potential rival bidders has a powerful effect, and the authors ascertain that market gains (losses) to acquirers' shareholders do not distort the associations between acquisition premia and sources of value. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.