Monetarism, Bondism, and Inflation
批评了货币主义主张的固定货币增长率规则，指出该规则长期要求政府持续赤字，短期则受制于综合预算约束，政府必须在税收、支出、债券或货币发行间做出调整。
INFLATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED as Public Enemy No. 1. Many who hold this view attribute inflation to the Federal Reserve's willingness to finance government deficits with newly printed money. It is argued that inflation would end if only the Federal Reserve would instead commit itself to increasing the money supply at a constant rate, equal to the long-run growth rate of real output. Increases in the monetary base would still require some open market operations, unless the Federal Reserve decides to employ more colorful operating procedures such as helicopter raids, national lotteries, or tooth fairies. But the Federal Reserve is advised to conduct these operations at a steady pace irrespective of the state of the economy or the size of the Treasury's budget deficits. This recommended monetary policy has both long-run and short-run implications for Treasury deficits. In the long run, if the monetary base is always growing, then the Treasury's budget must be endlessly in deficit, or else the Federal Reserve will have to begin accumulating private debt after the supply of Treasury debt is exhausted. In the short run, the government will have to comply with its consolidated budget constraint: government spending must be financed by tax revenue, bond sales, or money issuance. Cyclical swings in government revenues and expenditures will automatically cause the government's deficit to rise during recessions and fall during booms. The government's budget constraint implies that inaction is impossible. As revenues and expenditures fluctuate, the government must make offsetting changes in tax rates, spending, bonds sales, or money issuance. One strategy, analyzed elsewhere [61, is to adjust spending or tax rates so as to maintain a continually balanced budget. Another possibility, considered here, is to