Leadership based on asymmetric information
研究了理性追随者为何自愿服从信息更充分的领导者，发现领导者满足可信条件时能实现最优效率，否则效率极低；多领导或高成本领导可恢复可信性，且信息投资会内生产生领导者。
Rational players, unconstrained by contracts or formal authority, choose to follow a better-informed leader, whose action reveals part of her information. If the leader satisfies a credibility condition, then the unique nondegenerate equilibrium solves distinct shirking and coordination problems and achieves the first best. If credibility fails, as is more likely for a large organization, then followers ignore the leader, and equilibria are very inefficient. Appointing multiple leaders, or a high-cost leader, can restore credibility. If players invest privately in information, then a leader often appears endogenously. The equilibrium concept is an original extension of sequential equilibrium to continuous states.