On the Segmentation of Markets
研究异质性个体在搜索摩擦和非转移效用下如何选择市场，内生决定市场结构。均衡中市场完全分割，个体与第一个遇到的人匹配，匹配的同配性高于标准模型。
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.