The Role of Risk Preferences in Pay-to-Bid Auctions
分析了付费竞价拍卖中，竞拍者每次加价需付费的机制，发现风险偏好影响卖家收入，风险中性时收入与标准拍卖相同，风险偏好则增加收入，且轻微风险偏好最能解释实际拍卖行为。
We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions (assuming risk-neutral bidders). If risk-loving preferences are incorporated in the model, expected revenue increases. Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data. The degree of fit depends on how unobserved parameters are chosen; in particular, a slight preference for risk has the biggest impact in explaining auction behavior, suggesting that pay-to-bid auctions are a mild form of gambling. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.