Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information
论证在合理假设下，贷款人无法完全了解借款人特征会导致投资超过社会最优水平，提高利率可恢复最优，这与普遍观点相悖，并与Stiglitz-Weiss模型对比，揭示不同假设下债务或股权成为均衡融资方式。
This paper shows that under plausible assumptions, the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level. Raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality. This conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the Stiglitz-Weiss model. It is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance. However, under the Stiglitz-Weiss assumptions, used to derive an underinvestment result, equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance.