Resource Extraction by a Monopolist with Influence over the Rate of Return on Non-Resource Assets
动态分析垄断者（如OPEC）在有限资源存量下，其非资源资产回报率受开采决策影响时的最优开采路径，考虑最大最小准则和贴现效用两种目标。
In the last few years, a number of papers have given treatment to the problem of optimizing resource extraction in an open economy (cf. Dasgupta, Eastwood and Heal [1978], Aarrestad [1978] amoong others). Most of this literature treats the resource price as exogenous for the country considered. There is also a considerable literature treating the optimal resource extraction by a monopolistic firm which can influence the resource price; see for instance Lewis [1976], Stiglitz [1976] and Sweeney [1977]. Some of this literature (Cremer and Weitzman [1976], Hnyilicza and Pindyck [1976], Kalymon [1975] and Schmalensee [1976]) explicitly use OPEC's decision problem as their starting point. However, all of this literature treats the monopolist's rate of return on non-resource assets as independent of the extraction path chosen. For an important resource, for instance, oil, this is clearly an unsatisfactory assumption. In a recent paper, Calvo and Findlay [1978] have analyzed the optimal policy of a resource extracting monopolist (for instance OPEC) when the assumption above is relaxed. On the other hand, their analysis is mainly static and they disregard the crucial fact that the total resource supply is limited. Due to these properties, their paper only gives limited insight into the behavior of a resource extracting monopolist. The present paper gives a dynamic analysis of a monopolist's optimal extraction of a finite resource stock, when the monopolist's rate of return on non-resource assets depends on its resource extraction. One obvious interpretation is OPEC, which owns considerable stocks of foreign reserves and other financial assets. It seems reasonable to expect the rate of return on such assets to depend on the price OPEC charges for its oil. Alternative interpretations are of course also possible; some of these will be given in the concluding sections. Throughout the paper, I will assume that the objective function of the monopolist is some function of the time path of consumption which resource extraction and earnings on other assets give rise to. Two specific objective functions will be considered: (1) the maximin criterion (cf. Solow [1974] for an application of this criterion to a problem of resource extraction), and (2) discounted utility of consumption. In Section 2 the constraints of the optimization problem will