Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
研究认为强势CEO可能促使董事会将绩效衡量权重转向表现更好的指标，从而操纵激励薪酬。基于美国数据，操纵至少占薪酬绩效敏感性的10%，且随CEO人力资本和企业波动性增加而增加；操纵程度高于均值一个标准差的企业，后续企业价值下降4.8%，经营资产回报率下降7.5%。
ABSTRACT We argue that some powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures, thereby rigging incentive pay. A simple model formalizes this intuition and gives an explicit structural form on the rigged incentive portion of CEO wage function. Using U.S. data, we find support for the model's predictions: rigging accounts for at least 10% of the compensation to performance sensitivity and it increases with CEO human capital and firm volatility. Moreover, a firm with rigged incentive pay that is one standard deviation above the mean faces a subsequent decrease of 4.8% in firm value and 7.5% in operating return on assets.