On the Contract Curve: A Test of Alternative Models of Collective Bargaining
用纽约州公立学校教师数据，检验了集体谈判中工资就业结果是否落在雇主劳动需求曲线之外的契约曲线上，结果支持契约曲线模型。
The traditional model of collective bargaining confines unions to settlements constrained by the employer's labor demand curve, but an alternative model places wage-employment outcomes on a contract curve that extends beyond the labor demand curve. This paper derives a multidimensional (hedonic) contract-curve model in which employment-security provisions are used to maintain efficient bargains outside the employer's demand curve and distinguishes empirically between the contract-curve and demand-constraint models using data for public school teachers in New York State. Estimates clearly support the contract-curve model over the demand-constraint model by linking the gap between compensation and the value of the marginal product to the strength of employment-security provisions.