Pyrrhic victories: the cost to the board of ousting the CEO
研究发现，董事会罢免CEO会付出高昂代价，自身成员离职率显著上升，尤其是因监督失职导致的强制离职，后续董事会离职率高达40.55%。
Going against anecdotal evidence and common perception, the findings presented here show that boards who take action against their CEOs do so only at great cost to themselves, winning only a pyrrhic victory. Indeed, the findings presented show three distinct levels of board turnover. Normal attrition in periods of continuity produced a turnover of 10.99 per cent over two years; routine retirement exists (22.35 per cent) produced a similar turnover level to forced exits which did not imply a failure of the board to perform its monitoring function (25.36 per cent). However, forced CEO exits which implied a failure in the board's monitoring and advising roles caused a dramatically higher level of subsequent board turnover (40.55 per cent). These findings demonstrate that is not only the CEO that is forced to sacrifice his or her job when a company is in distress, but that the board is also accountable for its failure to perform its monitoring and advising duties adequately. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.