Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
研究一方投资并获取关于自身默认收益的私人信息时，低效寻租行为可能推翻产权理论的重要结论，例如即使只有不可或缺的一方A进行投资，由B方拥有所有权也可能是最优的。
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision.