The Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on Auditing and Internal Control Strength
通过理论模型分析萨班斯-奥克斯利法案如何影响审计强度和内部控制选择，发现法案虽增强了内控、减少了舞弊，但未必增加控制测试，且审计风险上升。
We provide a theoretical investigation of the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on auditing intensity and internal control strength. We propose a model of strategic auditing in which the auditor can use resources for both internal control tests and substantive tests, while the manager can choose the strength of internal controls and the amount of fraud. We find that control tests are a valuable tool for the auditor when control strength is informative about the likelihood of fraud. We find that Sarbanes-Oxley has the desired effect of inducing stronger internal control systems and less fraud, but does not necessarily induce higher levels of control testing. Our model suggests that audit risk increases as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.